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Summary  findiings
Explanations of what caused  the Asian crisis have  At the core of the corporate crisis were financial
focused on macroeconomic factors. Pomerleano offers a  excesses that violated prudent financial practices and
complementary perspective focusing on corporate  eventually led to the inevitable financial distress.
distress and corporate finance.  The empirical findings support K(rugman's  view: that
He presents key ratios for companies in various  crony capitalism lay at the core of the crisis. Crony
countries. Using global benchmarking, he imposes a  capitalism was manifested in poor policies - implicit
consistent cross-border analysis of financial risk and  government guarantees and poor  banking supervision -
performance. He provides a statistical review of  that led to poor  decisions about credit allocation in the
corporate financial practices and performance in Hong  banking-dominated financial system.
Kong, Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, the  Preliminary findings also suggest vast differences in
Philippines, Taiwan (China), and Thailand - economic value-added among countries (both industrial
benchmarked against corporate financial data for other  and developing). In an era of increasing capital mobility,
countries in Latin America and for four industrial  corporations are not adhering to global standards in
countries: France, Germany, Japan, and the United  creating shareholder value.
States.  The implications for enhanced regulation and
One common pattern emerges from the analysis:  supervision of the financial system are unmistakable. The
unsustainable rapid (and probably excessive)  investment  recent introduction  of improved loan classification
in fixed assets financed by excessive borrowing in some  systems and capital adequacy norms are encouraging first
Asian countries (for example, Indonesia, Korea, and  steps toward better regulation and supervision. But they
Thailand).  must be supplemented by an improved regulatory
The result of the East Asian investment spending spree  framework and better enforcement.
was poor profitability, reflected in low and declining
returns on equity and capital.
This paper is  a product of the Development Prospects Group, Office  of the Senior Vice President, Development Economics.
Copies of the paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433.  Please contact
Noemi Dacanay, room l6P-198, telephone 202-473-4068, fax202-974-4802,  Internetaddressndacanay@worldbank.org.
The author may be contacted at  mpomerleano@worldbank.org.  October 1998.  (36 pages)
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THE EAST ASIA CRISIS  AND CORPORATE  FINANCES  - THE UNTOLD  MICRO STORY
by
MICHAEL POMERLEANO'
Abstract: Explanations of the causes of the Asian crisis have focused on macroeconomic factors
leading to the crisis. This paper offers a complementary corporate distress perspective linking the
crisis to corporate finances. Key ratios for companies in various countries are presented in the
paper. The global benchmarking imposes a consistent cross-border analysis of financial risk and
performance, and sheds light on the crisis. The study provides a statistical review of the financial
practices  and  performance  of  corporates  in  Asia: Hong  Kong,  Indonesia,  Korea,  Malaysia,
Philippines,  Taiwan,  and  Thailand  benchmarked  against  financials  of  corporates  in  other
countries:  Latin America,  and  industrialized  countries: France,  Germany,  Japan  and  USA.  A
thematic  point  that  comes  across  in  all  the  results  of  the  corporate  financial  analysis  is
unsustainable  rapid  (and probably excessive)  investment in fixed assets financed  by excessive
borrowing  in  some  Asian  countries-  e.g.,  Indonesia,  Korea  and  Thailand.  The  East  Asian
investment-spending spree resulted in poor profitability, reflected in low, and declining return on
equity, and return on capital employed. It leads to the conclusion that at the core of the corporate
crisis were financial excesses that violated prudent financial practices, and eventually  lead to the
inevitable financial distress we are witnessing. Therefore, the empirical findings presented in the
paper lend credence to the view advanced by Krugman that crony capitalism was at the core of
the crisis.  Crony capitalism was manifested in supportive bad policies-e.g., implicit government
guarantees,  and  poor banking supervision- that  lead to  poor credit  allocation decisions  in the
banking  dominated  financial  system. Preliminary  findings suggest  as well  vast  differences  in
Economic  Value Added between  countries-  developing and  developed alike. The conclusions
from an economic value added approach indicate, that in an era of increasing capital mobility,
corporates are not adhering to global standards in creating sharelholder  value.  The analysis leads
to policy conclusions.
1 Jack Glen provided most useful comments. I am grateful for dedicated research assistance
from Margaret Enis.3
"With leveraging, there will always exist the possibility ... of a cascading sequence of  defaults that will
culminate in financial implosion if it proceeds unchecked," Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, at
a May 8,  1998 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago conference. This statement was made regarding banks in
developing countries relying excessively on borrowing from abroad. It is, as well, very much applicable to
the corporate financing pattems of corporates in sorne Asian countries.
OVERVIEW
What  Caused  Asia's economic  and  currency crisis,  and the  ensuing  contagion  is  the
subject of much debate. Most of the explanations on the causes of the crisis of the Asia
crisis  have  focused  on  macroeconomic  factors,  including  underlying  vulnerabilities 2
(financial sector vulnerabilities, and inconsistent macro economic policies), emphasis on
the role of  financial panic as an  essential element in the crisis 3,  and the distortionary
impact of guarantees on the financial system.
This paper provides an perspective on the corporate roots of the financial crisis in Asia.
McKinsey Global Institute recently studied how Germany, Japan, and the US put their
capital to use, examining capital productivity within the entire economy as well as in five
separate industries 5. The study addresses the productive  use of capital: use  of physical
capital (machinery and buildings) and by reference the implication for derived financial
assets-stocks. The findings are that the US outperforms Japan and Germany by roughly
one-third: the US average returns of 9 percent over a 20-year period compare with just
over  7 percent  in Germnany  and Japan.  The higher capital productivity translated .nto
higher financial returns for equity investors. Michael Jensen's Presidential Address to the
American Finance Association documents that a large number of US corporations do not
2 World Bank, Global Development Finance, 1998
3 Radelet, Steven and Jeffrey Sachs, The Onset of the East Asian Financial Crisis, Harvard Institute for
International Development, March 30, 1998.
4  Krugman argues that  a  system of  implicit guarantees lead to  incentives to choose the  highest  return
investments regardless of risk (refereed to as the Pangloss value) See Krugman,  Paul What happened to
Asia? January 1998
S Agrawal,  Raj et al  in Capital Productivity: Why the  US Leads  and  Why  it Matters ,  The McKinsey
Quarterly, 1996 Number 34
earn the cost of capital 6. It pursues the line of argument advanced by Frank Veneroso and
Robert Wade in  The Asian Financial Crisis. the Unrecognized Risk of the IMF's Asia
Package,  19987. Veneroso and  Wade argue that  Asia's high-debt model  of  economic
development is a.  consequence of the intermediation process for savings in the Asian
economies,  and quest for rapid economic growth.  In a similar line of inquiry the paper
explores the financial profile and performance of capital in developing countries. Key
ratios  for  companies  in  various  countries  are  presented  in  the  paper.  The  global
benchmarking  imposes  a  consistent  cross-border  analysis  of  financial  risk  and
performance, and sheds light on the crisis.
The  analysis  extends empirically, and  complements  the macro  leverage argument  of
Veneroso and Wade by reviewing the financial profile and performance of corporations.
It concludes that there were serious problems at the micro level - excess leverage, and
poor  profitability.  The  findings  support  the  view  advanced  by  Krugman  that  crony
capitalism,  and  the  supportive bad  policies-  implicit  guarantees,  and  poor  banking
supervision-  lead to poor credit decisions in the banking system, and  misallocation of
resources.  The evident policy implications virtually write themselves, and ensue from the
analysis.
The  structure  of  the  paper  is  as  follows.  Section  A  presents  the  financial  analysis
methodology, key results and their interpretation. Section B offers a  discussion of the
implications of the crisis on corporate finances, and documents that it was not an accident
that the  crisis  started in  Thailand, in  light of the profound  excesses. The  concluding
section offers an interpretation of the causes of the high leverage of corporates, and policy
implications for financial sector development.
6 Jensen, Michael C, The modern industrial  revolution,  exit, and the failure of internal  control systems,
The Journal of Finance, Jul 1993
7  Wade, Robert and Frank Veneroso, "The Asian Crisis: The High Debt Model vs. the Wall Street-
Treasury-IMF  Complex",  New Left  Review  228, March-April,  1998,  pp. 3-235
SECTION A: KEY SUMMARY  OF FINANCIALS
The  objective  of  the  analysis  in  this  section  is  to  determine  the  performance  of
corporations in Asia: Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan, and
Thailand. It benchmarks their financial profile and performance against the corporates in
the other countries. Their financial profile and performance is compared to corporations
in Latin America 8, and industrialized countries: France, Germany, Japan and USA. For
this purpose, I have obtained financial information on companies for 1992- 1996 from the
Financial Times Information's Extel Card database 9. Table I presents the sample size, and
coverage of GDP for the respective countries. We used as a basis for our analysis the
financial data- i.e., balance sheets; income statements and cash flows analysis of listed
non-financial  companies.  The  companies  selected for the  analysis  were  classified  as
general manufacturing, extractive industries, and utilities for which there was 5 years of
consecutive  financials ending  in  1996 for the  respective  countries.  The resulted  are
presented are weighted averages (by sales) of the constant sample.
Table 1- The Sample
Country  Companies in the Sample'"  Sales Revenue as a Percent of GDP"'
Hong Kong  47  7
Indonesia  122  2
Korea  44  14
Malaysia  211  21
Philippines  29  2
Singapore  92  17
Taiwan  16  n/a
Thailand  173  5
Latin America  21  n/a
France  143  28
Germany  232  26
Japan  254  24
USA  289  28
8 I lumped Latin America  because of the  small number of companies in any  one country and lack of a
representative sample.
9 Financial  Times  Information's  Extel  database  is a  database with  fundamental  data on  over  13, 000
companies worldwide.
'° General manufacturing, extractive industries, utilities, and consumer goods
"Average  1992-19966
Reviews  of corporate  financial  practices  and performance  focus on relative  ratio analysis.
The financing  patterns are recorded  in ratios:  Leverage  (Debt-equity),  Debt sustainability
(EBITDA/Interest),  Liquidity ( Current Liabilities  to Total Liabilities), Tangible Fixed
Assets Growth  and their financing.  The corporate  performance  profitability  is captured  in
ratios of Return  on Equity supplemented  by Return  on Capital  Employed  and Economic
Value Added. The ratios analysis is supplemented  by an indicator  of corporate financial
fragility- Altman's Z Score. Another indicator of corporate vitality calculated for this
study is Tobin q.
At the onset, it is important  to point out a caveat.  Due to different  accounting standards
and conventions' 2, possible  reporting  errors and, and potential  bias in a limited sample,  in
isolation,  any one individual  statistic, might not be fully representative,  and should be
interpreted with caution. However the combined evidence is reflective of underlying
patterns.
FINANCING  PATTERNS
Leverage. I use the debt-equity  ratio equals a company's  debt divided by shareholder's
equity, and indicates how much borrowed money a company is using relative to  its
equity. Table 2 and Figures 1 and 2 presents  the findings.  Two aspects  are notable.  First,
the wide differences  in the Debt/Equity  Ratios in Asia. The high leverage  contrasts with
moderate debt-equity  ratios in Hong Kong (39 percent  on 12/31/96),  Philippines and
Taiwan. An interesting  finding  is that debt-equity  ratios vary widely  in our sample.  Latin
American,  German  and US companies  have modest  debt-equity  ratios (90 percent in the
US), whereas  Thai, and Korean  companies  generally  have  high debt-equity  ratios (around
12  International  comparison of  accounting results  has relevance  if measured  consistently,  however  this
meaning  can  be  blurred  in a  cross-border  analysis.  For  instance,  depreciation  and  asset  revaluation
practices  differ  in various  countries. Although the  Extel  data base makes adjustments to  the  financial
statements of  companies to enable international comparisons, and domestic accounting  conventions  are
converted  to international common denominators, such as calculated cash flow potential inconsistencies
remain.  For  instance, non-consolidated  statements  are  also common  in Korea  and  Indonesia,  and  the
possibility of companies with cross shareholdings and double-leverage is not factored into the analysis.7
150 percent)' 3. The  ratios  presented  also  are  lower  than  other  reported  findings  of
leverage.  When  calculating  debt/equity  ratios  for  firms,  I  calculate  only  explicitly
reported  short  and  long  term  debt,  rather  than  liabilities,  because  consideration  of
liabilities  varies  internationally' 4. Therefore  the  analysis  understates  the  extent  of
leverage. Further possible explanations for the differences are attributable to using only
reported debt, as well as a weighted average, rather than medians.  Second, the rapidly
increasing debt equity ratios in Asia. For instance, in Thailand leverage increased from
71 percent on 12/31/92 to  155 percent on 12/31/96. Similar growth is evident in Korea,
Malaysia,  and  Indonesia.  As  subsequently documented, the build  up  of  leverage  is
attributable to the financing of rapid acquisition of fixed assets.
Table 2- Leverage See footnote 15
Total Debt/Equity  12/31/92  12/31/93 12/31/94  12/31/95  12/31/96
Hong Kong  26%  23%  33%  36%  39%
Indonesia  59%  54%  58%  81%  92%
Korea  123%  129%  127%  1  32  N/A
Malaysia  31%  29%  38%  45%  62%
Philippines  81%  78%  50%  49%  69%
Singapore  37%  34%  33%  45%  58%
Taiwan  71%  73%  71%  67%  65%
Thailand  71%  81%  103%  135%  155%
Latin America  31%  35%  34%  33%  31%
France  141%  133%  117%  112%  111%
Germany  61%  67%  61%  59%  58%
Japan  136%  139%  139%  135%  138%
USA  106%  102%  97%  94%  90%
13 Corporate  data on foreign  exchange  indebtedness  was not reported  in the Financial  Times Information's
Extel database.  However,  evidence  on aggregate corporate  indebtedness  is available  from BIS. The data
suggests excessive reliance on foreign debt by corporates  in Indonesia and Thailand , most of it not
hedged.
"' Balance-sheet  obligations  can often  be significant  and subject  to differing  methods  of calculation.  For
example, pensions are handled very differently  in different  countries: U.S. firms explicitly  reflect the
pension  asset/liability  on their balance  sheet, while  German  firms  do not. Therefore
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Tangible Fixed Assets  Growth and their financing.  Capital assets are tangible "fixed
assets." The analysis in Table 3 and graph in Figure 3 suggests a rapid built up of Fixed
Assets in Asia.  The average percent change in tangible Fixed Assets during the 1992-97
period is 33  percent in Indonesia;  Malaysia- 20 percent; and Thailand - 29 percent. This
growth is in stark contrast the more moderate pattern Hong Kong-17 percent,  and  1 -5
percent in developed countries.
Table 3 - Percent Change in Tangible Fixed Assets
12/31/92  12/31/93  12/31/94  12/31/95  12/31/96  Average
Hong Kong  n/a  22°/a  17%  15%  13%  17%
Indonesia  n/a  22%  37%  36%  35%  33%
Korea  n/a  11%  15%  24%  i/a  17%
Malaysia  n/a  15%°  21%  18%  26%  20%
Philippines  n/a  13%1  9%  5%  15%  11%
Singapore  n/a  19%  32%  20%  27%  250/o
Taiwan  n/a  9%  3%  -5%  24%  8%
Thailand  n/a  25%  47%  27%  17%  29%
Latin America  n/a  -2%  8%  12%  8%  7%/
France  n/a  2%  1%  -1%  2%  1  %
Germnany  n/a  2%  1%  1%  6%  3  %
IJapan  n/a  5%O  5°%  5%  3%  51
|USA  n/a  2%  3%  3%  5%  3%
Figure 3
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I estimate the financing patterns of new investment based on an analysis of Sources and
Uses of Funds" 6. In Table 4  I use the cash flow analysis to estimate the total percent debt
funding of investment in fixed assets, and calculate Total debt financing of investment as
a ratio of investments for each year' 7.
Table 4- Debt Raised & Repaid as a % of Investments
Country  93  94  95  96 Average
Hong Kong  23%  62%  36%  58%  45%
Indonesia  37%  56%  103%  70%  67%
Korea  86%  52%  75%  62%  69%
Malaysia  19%  44%  57%  61%  45%
Philippines  46%  -46%  28%  73%  25%
Singapore  14%  19%  66%  58%  39%
Taiwan  55 /o  62%  50%  23%  47%
Thailand  71%  72%  102%  69%  78%°
Latin America  34%  17%  13%  10%  19%
France  -13%  -18%  -26%  -1%  -14%
Germany  16%  -8%  8%  8%  6%
Japan  11%  17%1  15%  9%/  13%
USA  -9%  11%°  21%  10%  8%
The results supporlt  the conclusion of the increasing reliance on debt in Asian countries.
The  wide  disparity  in  funding  patters  are  striking. Figure  4  shows  that  while  Latin
American,  German, Japanese and US  companies relied on  roughly  8-19 percent  debt
financing, the ratios in the vulnerable countries in Asia ranges around 45- 78 percent,
with Indonesia  averaging 69 percent from  93 to  96, Korea  69 percent  ,  Malaysia 45
16  Cash  flow is computed  as the difference  between  incoming  and outgoing  payments.  Cash  Flow is
derived  from the Operating  Profit by adjusting  for items,  which do not affect payments  (e.g. depreciation
and amortization),  and items (e.g. changes  in working  capital)  which affect  payments  but are not recorded
in the Operating  Profit.
Cash Flow statement  explains  the difference  between  cash at the beginning  of the period, and cash at the
end of the period. Free Cash Flow before income  taxes and financial  income is available  for payment  to
stockholders, and creditors income tax payments, and for investments.
'7 Although  money is fungible,  and such limited  analysis in isolation  has deficiencies  (without reviewing
dividend  policies,  etc), the relative  values  are indicative  of the funding  profile.11
percent,  and Thailand 78 percent vs. moderate ratios in  Hong Kong (45 percent),  and
Philippines 25 percent.
Figure  4









In this context, the key ratio medians for U.S. industrial companies (Table 5) calculated
by Standard and Poor8, and factored in the rating process are illustrative' 9. Although what
is a sustainable ratio differs by country (and industry),  it is the norm to expect companies
with  solid potential, and stable earnings and prudent financial policies to  total debt to
capitalization  is 40 percent (a Debt/Equity ratio of 66 percent). A thematic point that
comes across from  the evidence on the corporate  investment and  funding  analysis is
unsustainable rapid  investment in fixed assets financed by excessive borrowing in some
Asian  countries.  These  findings  manifest  the  untenable  business  growth  in  Asian
countries. It  is a reasonable premise that no well managed  company 20 can digest  in a
18 Explanations  and  medians  for the ratios for U.S. companies  can be found in Standard & Poor Rating
Services,  Corporate  Ratings  Criteria.
'9 The benign  interest rate environment and availability of term financing in the US suggests that the US
numbers represent an upper bound on acceptable financial practices.
20 With the possible exception of software companies.12
prudent  fashion  annual  growth  of  30-  40  percent  without  stretching  already  thin
managerial capacity, and distribution and marketing channels.
Table 5: KEY INDUSTRIAL  FINANCIAL  RATIOS
Three-year  (1994  to 1996)  medians  AAA  AA  A  BBB  BB  B
EBITDA  interest  coverage  (x)  20.3  14.94  8.51  6.03  3.63  2.27
Funds from operations/total  debt (%)  116.4  72.3  47.5  34.7  18.4  10.9
Pretax  return  on capital(%).  31.5  23.6  19.5  15.1  11.9  9.1
Operating  income/sales(%)  24  19.2  16.1  15.4  15.1  12.6
Long-tenn  debt/capital  (%)  13.4  21.9  32.7  43.4  53.9  65.9
Total debt/capitalization  (%)  23.6  29.7  38.7  46.8  55.8  68.9
Total Current Liabilities/Total Liabilities. The Total Current Liabilities/Total Liabilities
ratio is simply a company's current liabilities divided by its Total Liabilities. From this
ratio, I determine the maturity structure of the  companies debts, and pending refinancing
needs  in  Table  6  and  Figure  5.  A  more  comprehensive  liquidity  analysis  can  be
supplemented by other ratios, such as Current Ratio 21.
Table 6- Total Current Liabilities/Total Liabilities
______|  12/31/92  12/31/93  12/31/94  12/31/95 12/31/96 Average
Hong Kong  58%  62%  63%  64%  61%  63%
Indonesia  52%  56%  56%  50%  45%  52%
Korea  54%  52%  53%  52%  n/a  52%
Malaysia  66%  64%  61%  61%  59%  61%
Philippines  51%  52%  60%  58%  54%  56%
Singapore  77%  82%  80%  80%  78%  80%
Taiwan  64%  66%  65%  68%  61%  65%
Thailand  64%  64%  62%  60%  60%  62%
Latin America  38%  33%  40%  39%  48%  40%
France  51%  50%  50%  51%  52%  51%
Germany  31%  31%  31%  31%%  31%%  31%
Japan  57%  56%  53%  54%  56%  55%
USA  =  40%  35%  38%  35%  36%  36%
21 The current  ratio is a company's  current  assets  divided  by its current  liabilities.  From  this ratio, we
determine  whether  a company  could  pay off its debts  with  its current  assets  if it needed  to- i.e.,  a  ratio
greater  than 1 .13
Figure 5
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The maturity structure of debt presented for 1992-1996 indicates in Table 5 that in Asia
(Hong Kong,  Indonesia, Japan,  Korea,  Malaysia,  Philippines, Taiwan,  and  Thailand)
approximately 60 percent of the liabilities were current during  1992-1996; while Latin
America, and industrialized countries (France, Germany, and USA) only 30-40 percent of
the liabilities are current. A notable trend is visible in Indonesia to lengthen the maturity.
The findings suggest that a liquidity problem  is imminent in the Asian crisis. Although
companies can not raise new funds, they faces the task of repaying or servicing a large
burden of short-term debts (approximately 60 percent). It is discouraging to note in this
context,  that  prospects  for refinancing in the Asian  equity and bond  markets  are not
promising.
EBITDA/Interest.  Debt  service analysis uses the ratio of operating  cash  flow, before
interest, taxes and depreciation (EBITDA) to annual interest on the loans or debt service.
The EBITDA coverage ratio is indicative of the ability of the cash flow to adequately pay
back the annual interest (EBITDA/JInterest)  and principal (EBITDA/Interest + Principal)
on  outstanding debt. The findings presented in Table 7 and Figure 6 are indicative of vast14
differences  across  countries.  The deterioration  in Asian countries  is manifested:  coverage
in Thailand declined to 1.92x in 1996 from 4.6 x in 1992, as an increase  in debt/equity
lead to a rise in interest expense.  EBITDA  patterns in other vulnerable  Asian countries:
Indonesia (2.44X in 1996), Korea (1.07x in 1995) are similar. Malaysia, Taiwan, and
Hong Kong are more robust. Latin America(25.36X  in 1996), and some industrialized
countries: Germany(7.09X  in 1996), France (4.75X in 1996),  Japan (4.31X in 1996),
and USA (7.62X  in 1996)  are quite robust . In this context,  the S&P credit rating policies
are instructive  again. US A rated companies  are expected to have at least eight times
EBITDA/  Interest  coverage.
Table  7- Cash Flow Coverage-EBITDA/Interest  Payable
|  12/31/92  12/31/93  12/31/94  12/31/95  12/31/96  Average
Hong Kong  19.29  25.85  21.77  13.59  11.07  18.31
Indonesia  0.03  0.52  2.18  3.07  2.44  1.65
Korea  1.42  1.41  1.89  1.77  1.07  1.51
Malaysia  9.09  9.76  11.73  9.62  6.74  9.39
Philippines  1.89  2.59  2.93  4.31  3.68  3.08
Singapore  12.40  14.37  11.70  8.80  8.05  11.06
Taiwan  5.73  4.71  6.30  5.12  4.08  5.19
Thailand  4.60  4.12  3.83  2.47  1.92  3.39
Latin America  15.57  9.52  14.45  14.28  25.36  15.84
France  3.06  2.88  3.87  3.85  4.75  3.68
Germany  5.30  4.79  5.96  6.291  7.09  5.89
Japan  21.57  3.49  3.68  3.46  4.31  7.30








Altman 's ZScore.  Developed by Edward Altman 22, Altman's Z-score statistical technique
calculates  five ratios found in a company's financial statements: return on total assets,
sales to total assets, equity to debt, working capital to total assets, and retained earnings
to  total  assets. These ratios are then multiplied by predetermined  weight factors, and
added together.  The Z-score--yields a  number between --4  and +8. Financially  sound
companies show Z-scores above 2.99, while those  scoring below  1.81 are  financially
distressed  , and  face  possible  bankruptcy in  an  environment conducive  to  corporate
reorganizations. Scores between 1.81 and 2.99 indicate vulnerability.
The findings  in Table 8 demonstrate again the considerable fragility of the corporate
sector  in  certain  sections  of  Asia,  as  well  as  France.  The  Z  performance  results,
corroborate the previous findings. By 1996, the ratings in Asia evidence severe financial
distress in Indonesia at 2.66, Korea at 1.55, and Thailand at 1.5; in contrast, Malaysia at
22 Edward 1. Altman, The Z-Score Bankruptcy Model: Past, Present, and Future (New York: John Wiley &
Sons,  1977), and Corporate Financial Distress and Bankruptcy, 2nd edition (New York:  John Wiley &
Sons,  1993). the Z  Score use  of multiple discriminant analysis (MDA) is designed to  predict corporate
failure. See Appendix  1 for the formula. In Altman's original expost study of 33 bankrupt companies, Z-
scores  for 95 percent  of these  companies  pointed  to trouble  or imminent  bankruptcy.16
3.9,  Philippines  at  3.4,  Hong  Kong  at  6.9  ,  and  Taiwan  at  3.2  are  robust.  Among
industrialized countries: France at 1.8, and Japan at 2.1 manifest vulnerability.
Table 8 -Altman's Z 23 Score - The Calculation
1992  1993  1994  1995  1996 Average
Hong  Kong  10.585  13.710  9.307  7.179  6.9  9.54
Indonesia  2.261  2.755  3.613  2.831  2.6  2.81
Korea  1.341  1.469  1.573  1.547  n/a  1.48
Malaysia  5.969  8.432  6.346  4.844  3.9  5.89
Philippines  2.357  3.506  4.867  4.259  3.4  3.68
Singapore  3.883  6.033  5.177  3.858  2.9  4.36
Taiwan  2.521  3.215  3.665  2.901  3.2  3.09
Thailand  3.115  4.481  2.934  2.269  1.5  2.86
Latin America  0.977  0.999  1.330  1.489  1.9  1.34
France  1.457  1.521  1.576  1.628  1.8  1.60
Germany  3.009  3.098  3.299  3.250  3.6  3.26
Japan  2.014  2.017  2.014  1.874  2.1  2.00
USA  2.715  2.819  2.924  3.559  3.8  3.16
Figure 7
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PROFITABILITY
Return on Equity. A company's return on equity percentage (ROE) indicates how well
the common stockholders' equity investment is performing. The percentage is the result
of dividing corporate net earnings after-tax by common stockholders' equity. We compare
the ROE for the respective countries to determine how well the companies are doing in a
global context. It should be noted, however, that the return on equity can not be viewed in
isolation of the prevailing opportunity costs of alternative instruments in the domestic and
international markets.
Figure  8
Return on Equity, average  1992-96
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The  findings  in  Table  9  and  Figure  8  are very  surprising.  While  the  average  ROE
performance during 92-96 in Hong Kong at 25 percent, Indonesia at 13 percent, Malaysia
at 13 percent, Philippines at 10 percent, Taiwan at II  percent, and USA at 12.20  percent
are  outstanding,  other  countries reflect tepid  returns.  Thailand average  ROE  of  9.3818
masks a rapid decline from 13 percent in  1992 to 5 percent by 1996; and Korea average
of  7  percent.  Latin  America's  ROE  of  9 percent  masks  high  inflation rates.  Some
industrialized countries: France's  5 percent, Germany's 7 percent, and Japan's percent are
surprisingly paltry rates of return.
Table 9 - Return on equity after tax
1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  Average
Hong Kong  29%  24%  27%  24%  21%  25%
Indonesia  14%  12%  12%  15%  1  3%O  13%
Korea  5%  4%  8%  11%  n/a  7%O/
Malaysia  12%  14%  14%  14%  13%  13%
Philippines  4%  7%  16%  12%/o  9%  10%
Singapore  10%  10%  9%  8%  8%  9%
Taiwan  12%  10%  14%  12%  8%  11%
Thailand  13%  10%  11%  9%  5%  10%
Latin America  3%  6%  10%  12%  14%  9%
France  7%  3%  6%  3%  6%  5  %
Germany  7%  3%  8%  6%  11%  7%
Japan  5%  3%  2%  2%  4%  4%
USA  4%  8%°  16%  16%  18%  12%
Return on Capital Employed (ROCE) Pre-Tax.  Return On Capital Employed or Assets
(ROCE)  is a  more  accurate indicator of profitability.  ROCE  is  defined as  Operating
Profit 24 divided by Capital Employed 25. ROCE gives a comprehensive information about
the  economic performance  of  the business,  since both  operating  and  non-  operating
results (e.g. proceeds from sale of property) are accounted for. An added advantage is that
it permits a comparison between businesses, without regard to accounting conventions
(e.g., depreciation), and different capital mobilization and  financing strategies, since the
operating profit is viewed in relation to the total funds employed. ROCE shows the rate
of return on capital employed for the period, and captures the efficiency in the total use of
capital resources.
24  Revenues-Cost  of sales-Selling  expenses-General  administrative  expenses-Research  and development
expenses-Restructuring  expenses  +/-Other  income  / expenses.
25 Represents  the necessary  operating  capital derived  from the balance  sheet  assets, i.e. balance  sheet  total
minus financial  items  and fiscal  items  which are not considered  as necessary  operating  capital.19
Table  10 and Figure 9 presents the findings with respect to  ROCE. Average ROCE in
Hong Kong of 20 percent is solid, Indonesia at  11 percent are good in absolute terms
(however,  as  subsequently  documented,  overshadowed  by  domestic  rates  of  15-18
percent).  The  rest  of  the  results  for  Korea,  Malaysia,  Philippines,  Taiwan,;  Latin
America,  and  industrialized  countries: France, Germany, Japan  and  USA  corroborate
previous findings.
The analysis of the ROCE data for Thailand, supplemented by the previous ROE  and
Leverage documents that it was not an accident that the Asian crisis started in Thailand.
Financial risk portrayed by quantitative means illustrates that Thailand was an outlier in
every regard !  Virtually all the evidence presented suggests that the performance of Thai
companies has deteriorated progressively during the period: credit ratios have declined,
margins have been squeezed, and a significant decline in ROE is evident from 13 percent
in 1992 to 5 percent in 1996.
Table  10-  Return on Capital Employed Pre-Tax (ROCE)
1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  Average
Hong  Kong  22%  21%  21%  19%  16%  20%
Indonesia  12%  11%  11%  11%  10%  11%
Korea  7%  6%  8%  9%  n/a  8%
Malaysia  12%  12%  11%  11%  10%  11%
Philippines  6%  7%  7%  8%  5%  7%
Singapore  9%  8%  8%  7%  7%  8%
Taiwan  8%  7%  10%  7%  5%  8%
Thailand  9%  7%  7%  7%  5%  7%
Latin America  15%  15%1  14%  14%  23%  16%
France  7%  5%  6%  5%  5%  5%
Germnany  4%  2%  4%  3%  5%  4%
Japan  6%  5%  4%  5%°  6%  5%
USA  9%  9%  11%  12%1  13%  11%20
Figure 9
Average RoCE Before Tax, 1992-96
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Economic value added. To address opportunity costs, to which we alluded in the ROCE
analysis,  we  introduce  a  concept  that  has  entered  the  financial  lexicon,  which  is
Shareholder Economic Value Added(E VA). Stem Stewart & Co. developed the concept
called EVA  to  measure the  value added  6.  This  analysis determines in  a  traditional
economic sense -- using opportunity costs --whether the company creates shareholder
value. EVA is trying to answer how does the reported profitability of a corporation--the
measured ROCE compare to the opportunity cost of capital 2". A Weighted Average Cost
of Capital (WACC) is used to assess opportunity costs, and determine the economic loss/
gain. An  advantage of EVA is that  it links  internal financial performance (corporate
profitability) and external financial costs in the capital markets by introducing an external
benchmark  hurdle  opportunity rate  that  reflects the  prevailing  cost  of  capital:  if  the
difference between the cost and ROCE is positive, wealth has been created, if it is not,
wealth has been destroyed. The Methodology for  Return on Economic Capital Analysis
uses  comprehensive  EVA calculations  that  develop net  present  value method  of  the
modified cash flow, and develop calculations of WACC 28.
26 Stewart  111,  G.B. The  questfor value.  New  York:  Harper-  Collins  Publishers,  Inc., 1991
27 EVA  considers  the cost  of capital  tied up in operations,  in terms  of the opportunity  cost  of that capital,
and  the  operating  profits,  net  of taxes,  generated  by the  capital  used.  EVA  is the  net  operating  profits  after
taxes minus  the cost of capital,  including  borrowed  capital  and equity  capital,  used to generate  those
profits.
28 A future  paper  being  prepared  in collaboration  with  Xin  Zhang  will  present  comprehensive  EVA,  and
WACC  calculations.21
Although an oversimplification of rigorous EVA analysis (which uses discounted present
values), in this paper 29 I limit the analysis to obtaining a rough indication of EVA by
comparing the ROCE to the following lending rates (Table 11) in the banking systems
(that proxy the cost for mobilizing debt) for 1992-1996.
Table 11:  Lending  interest  rate
1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  Average
Hong  Kong  7%  7%  9%  9%  9%  8%
Indonesia  24%  21%  18%  19%  19%  20%
Korea  10%  9%  9%  9%  9%  9%
Malaysia  9%  9%  8%  8%  9%  9%
Philippines  19%  15%  15%  15%  15%  16%
Singapore  6%  5%  6%  6%  6%  6%
Thailand  18%  16%  14%  ..  ..  16%
France  10%  9%  8%  8%  7%  8%
Germany  14%  13%  11%  1  1%  10%  12%
Japan  6%1  4%  4%  3%  3%  4%
United  States  6%1  6%  7%  9%  8%  7%
Source:  World  Bank,  World  Development  Indicators,  1998
The difference between ROCE and Lending Rates in Exhibit  is indicative of the EVA
(Table  12). Only  for Hong Kong, Japan, Malaysia,  Singapore, and the United  States
ROCE exceeds the cost of that capital base consistently over the 1992-1996 period ( and
with the exception of Hong Kong, not by a significant margin). However, there are vast
inter-temporal  differences  as  well:  trends  in  Economic  Value  Added  document  the
decline in EVA and deterioration in Thailand. Similarly, Japan positive EVA is largely
attributable to the low interest rate prevailing, rather than high ROCE. In contrast, the
analysis suggests that the negative EVA in Indonesia is attributable to the high prevailing
domestic interest rates. Following in Figure 10 are the finding on average economic value
added during the period.
29 For Thailand,  in the absence  of 95 and 96 data, I use the lending  rate up to 94.22
Table  12 ROCE-Lending  Rate
______  __ 1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  Average
Hong  Kong  15%  14%  12%  10%  7%  12%
Indonesia  -12%  -10%  -7%  -8%  -9%  -9%
Korea  -3%  -3%  -1%  0%  n/a  -2%
Malaysia  3%  3%  3%  3%  1°%  3%
Philippines  -13%  -8%  -8%  -7%  -10%  -9%
Singapore  3%  3%  2%  1%  I%  2%
Thailand  -9%  -9%  -7%  n/a  n/a  -8%
Latin America  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a
France  -3%  -4%  -2%  -3%  -2%  -3%
Germany  -10%  -11%  -7%  -8%  -5%  -8%
Japan  0%  1%  0%  2%  3%  1%
USA  3j  %  3_  %  4%  3%  5°/a  4%
Figure  1  0
Average  Economic  Value Added,  1992-1996
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Tobin 's Q .Tobin's q was introduced in 1969 by James Tobin to be used as a predictor of
a  company's future investments. The q ratio is a market-to-book ratio:  the ratio of  a23
company's equity plus debt to the value of the firm's assets, adjusted for inflation and
depreciation. The q ratio indicates whether the company has been able to create value for
shareholders with the assets under their control 30, and measures how much investors are
willing  to pay for the business. A Tobin q ratio over  1 means management has added
value for shareholders; and a Tobin q ratio lower than  1 indicates value has been lost.
Therefore, the ration measures the signals created by the equity markets in the respective
markets to invest in fixed assets, or take over existing assets. In this analysis it is used as
indicative  countries'  growth and profitability prospects, sheding light on whether there
was an environment conducive to capital expenditures created by market valuations.
Table 13 and Figure 11 present the calculations for  Tobin's q, and examine the potential
relationship  between  market  valuations,  incentives  for  investments  in  the  respective
countries 31.  Notable is the high level of  Tobin's q in Asia: Hong Kong at 235 percent for
1992-1996, Indonesia reaching a peak of 149 percent in  1994, Korea, Malaysia at 217
percent in 1993, Philippines at 162 percent for 1993, Taiwan at 164 percent for 1994, and
Thailand  at  249  percent  in  1993.  Latin  America,  and  industrialized  countries  by
comparison have more modest average Tobin q ratios during 1992-1996: Latin America
at 34 percent,  France at 54 percent, Germany at 50 percent, Japan at 97 percent  and USA
at  108 percent. The findings  finally offer a plausible explanation for the rapid capital
expenditures in Asian economies. They suggest that there were dominant market signals
stimulating rapid capital formation in the Asian economies, and a possible exit strategy
through the equity market. In this context, it is notable as well is that the peak of  Tobin q
in Asia is around 1993-94, a period associated with large portfolio equity  inflows.
30  The balance sheet reflects a company's  depreciated tangible  assets only, while the  market value of  a
company's securities is the best indicator of future profit potential, since it provides an estimate of future
cash flows attributable to all the company's assets.
31 A  limitation of this analysis is the use depreciated balance sheet data, and  lack of replacement costs.
However, I employ Tobin q  mainly in a comparative and relative sense, rather than absolute sense.24
Table 13-Approximation of Tobin's Q -Market value to book value of assets
1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  Average
Hong Kong  230%  277%/o  254%  205%  210%  235%
Indonesia  77%  96%  149%  137%  136%  119%
Korea  65%  77%  77%  72%  72%  72%
Malaysia  149%  217%  202%  162%  157%  178%
Philippines  109%  162%  162%  141%  150%  145%
Singapore  88%  135%  108%  102%  91%  105%
Taiwan  117%  158%  164%  124%  145%  142%
Thailand  141%  249%  174%  147%  107%  164%
Latin America  21%  25%  n/a  38%  38%  N/a
France  52%  57%  52%  53%  58%  54%
Germany  42%  51  %  50%  49%  57%  50%
Japan  90%  94%  98%  89%1  96%  93l
USA  98%  95%  96%  121%°  124%  107%
Figure I 1
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SECTION C:  EPILOGUE  To  CORPORATE  FINANCE  PRACTICES-  THE CRISIS
The data used for the previous analysis ends in December 1996. What has happened since
than? A partial picture emerges from recent investment bank research reports. We know
that  damage  ensuing  from  high  leverage  in  a  raising  interest  rates,  and  worsening
economic  environment,  coupled  unhedged  foreign  currency  denominated  loans
exposure 32, inflicted on vulnerable corporates in Asian countries. For instance, an analysis
done by Phatra Securities in Thailand on the impact of interest rates suggests a decline of
EBITDA  coverage  to  1.49X by  1997, that  is  projected  lower  for  1998.  Similarly,
Goldman Sachs (using the same method as that employed for Thailand by their research
cooperation partner for Thailand --Phatra Thanakit) estimated the EBITDA data for 1996,
1997 and  1998 for Asia 33. Using listed non-financial companies as the basis  for their
analysis, collecting financial information on these companies for 1996 and first-half 1997
and projected their  operating results  and financial position for  1997 and  1998.  Using
assumptions  regarding depreciation expenses, and average interest rates, etc. Goldman
Sachs estimates of  EBITDA/Interest Expenses for companies in their sample presented
in Figure  12. The findings suggest a rapid decline in debt service capacity.








32 The debt burden  was exacerbated  by the fall  of the Asian  currencies  against  the U.S.  dollar.
3  The results  for Asia  are presented  separately.26
Goldman  Sachs  estimates  as  well  the  number  of  companies  with  EBITDA/Interest
Expenses  under  1. Assuming  a close  correspondence between the  percentage  of non
performing  loans  and  distressed  corporates,  Exhibit  presents  an  analysis  done  by
Goldman  Sachs'  34  to  estimate  the companies  will not  be  able  to  service  debt.  The
findings  in  Table  14  document  a  rapid  increase  in  the  percentage  of  loans  (and
companies) in distress in  1998. In Indonesia 45.6 percent of corporates are distressed, in
Korea 31.5 percent of corporates, and in Malaysia 18.5 percent of corporates.
Table 14
Country/Year  No. of  Sales  as  Interest  Implied 35
Cos.  % of GDP  Coverage  Insolvent  Corporations
A  B  C
Philippines  1996  170  26%  5.2  8.7%
1997  170  25%  3.7  10.8%
1998  170  27%  3.31  18.4%1
Indonesia  1996  225  20%  3.7  8.0%
1997  207  16%  2.9  15.6%
1998  207  12%  1.31  45.6%
Korea  1996  667  96%  2.7  16.2%
1997  667  97%  2.2  20.7%
1998  667  97%  1.71  31.5%
Malaysia  1996  479  126%  6.5  8.3%
1997  479  123%  6.3  11.2%
1998  479  120%  4.31  18.5%
Source:  Goldman  Sachs
An  analysis done  by  Jardine Fleming to  assess  the impact of  exposure  to  unhedged
foreign  exchange  loans  suggests  that  Indonesian  corporates  are  virtually  insolvent.
Following  in  Table  15 is  the  aggregate  balance  sheet  of  the  top  50  non-financial
companies in terms of market capitalization as of 30 September 1997 when the exchange
rate was at Rph 3,275/US$. The equity is Rph 68.78 trillion. The exhibit 36 reflects the
3  Goldman  Sachs, Asset Quality  for Korean  Banks, Part 11,  Bottom-Up  Approach  for Estimating  NPLs,
February  19, 1998  and oither  Asia research.
35 Assuming  a close  correspondence  between  corporates  and non  perforrning  loans.
36 Jardine  Fleming,  Indonesia  Strategy  update,  Completely  irrational,  January  21, 199827
impact of the depreciation of the rupiah against the US$ on company's  balance sheets.
Assuming  that  these  companies  write-off  the  foreign  exchange  losses  (and  do  not
capitalize  their  forex  translation  losses 37)  the  aggregate  balance  sheet  at the  current
exchange rate of Rph 11,500/US$ will show a negative  equity of Rph 79.6 trillion. ($6.98
billion @ Rph 1  1,500/US$). Similar impact is being felt throughout the Asian region.
Table 15
(Rp trillion)
30 September 1997 -- exchange3,275/US$  Exchange rate of Rph  rate at Rphl1,500IUS$
Cash  30.05  Rph debts  24.12  Cash  30.05  Rph debts  24.12
AIR  16.55  F/X  debts  207.39  A/R  16.55  FIX  debts  207.39
Inventory  18.38  Others  33.88  Inventory  18.38  Others  33.88
Others  269.19  Equity  68.78  Others  120.86  Equity  -79.55
334.17  334.17  185.84  185.84
Source: Jardine  Fleming
The  erosion  of  equity  capital,  and  maturity  structure  of  debt in  Asia  indicates that
corporates have massive equity and debt  recapitalization needs. Within the limitations of
credit extension by a distressed banking system, the prospects for credit extensions, and
new financing are limited.  Similarly, recapitalization plans that rely heavily on equity
markets'  capacity, and rights  offerings might not be  realistic in the current depressed
stock  markets,  and  domestic  bond  markets  are  not  sufficiently developed  to  absorb
potential demand. Therefore, the prospects of  corporate to  fulfill their recapitalization
needs are questionable at this time.
3 The  accounting  convention  used  does  not  matter.  The  economic  impact  of the loss  is  the  same.28
SECTION C:  CONCLUSIONS  AND POLICY  IMPLICATIONS
Several conclusions are warranted from this financial analysis presented in the paper:
Financial benchnmarks.  The findings in the paper suggest a manifested lack of  financial
(and some lack of operational) discipline in some Asian countries. Thailand, Indonesia,
Korea stand as a beacon of risky practices that lead to financial distress. The investment-
spending  spree  contributed  to  erosion  of  profit  margins,  and  to  poor  financial
performance  reflected  in  declining, and  low  return  on  equity  and  return  on  capital
employed. Other countries in the region:  Hong Kong, Malaysia and Taiwan, manifest
prudent financial conduct 3".
A further surprising finding is the wide disparity in financing practices, and even more
so,  operating and financial performance across the spectrum developing and developed
countries covered in the analysis. The vast differences in economic value results between
countries lead to the conclusion, that in an era of increasing capital mobility, corporates
are not adhering to global standards in creating shareholder value. The problem that some
Asian  corporates  face,  along  with  French  and  Latin  American  listed  corporates,  is
underemployment of  capital.  In  an  era  of rapid  globalization, and  increasingly  free
capital  flows, where  capital can rapidly arbitrage differences  in  rates of  return,  such
disparities in underlying ROE and ROCE are probably not  sustainable in the long run.
The  realization  thLat financial  gravity  laws  for  corporates  can  not  be  defied,  and
unsustainable  debt/equity ratios, and poor  underlying operating results are not tenable
will eventually gain acceptance and will inevitably lead to distress similar to East Asia
corporates.  the  disparity  in  operating  and  financial  performance  in  crisis  and  other
countries  suggests  a  need  for  systemic  corporate  restructuring.  Corporates  need  to
demonstrate  to  investors  sustained  EVA  performance,  in  order  to  ensure  sustained
availability  of  equity  capital,  and  ensure  improved  equity  markets  performance.
3  It  is notable  that  Asian  countries  that  escaped relatively  unscathed  from  the  crisis-  Hong  Kong,
Philippines,  Singapore  and  Malaysia-  are  noted  for  progressive  regulatory  and  supervisory  practices
either/and open to foreign participation in the banking system.29
Therefore, Prospective corporate capital spending must be targeted with the overriding
criterion being the rate of return, and shareholder value.  a restructuring process needs as
well  to  reflect  a  readiness  to  address  insolvent  corporates  through  court-supervised
reorganization  or  bankruptcy;  promotion  of  voluntary  restructuring  of  distressed  and
illiquid -- but operationally viable-- corporates through debt/equity swaps, and provision
of  necessary  liquidity  during  the  workout  process  through  provision  for  debtor-in-
possession  financing 39;  as  well  as  recognition that  some  corporates  might  not  be
salvageable.
The Macro  Financial  Context  -Capital Market  Development:  There is  considerable
evidence  supporting  the  argument 40 that  Asia's  high-debt  and  high-risk  model  of
economic development  is a  direct result of  the savings intermediation process  in  the
Asian economies. The high savings rates in Asian economies, where the household sector
saves around a third of gross domestic product, were largely intermediated by banks to
businesses. The  pursuit of rapid economic growth in the region limited the capacity of
internal earnings generation to buffer accumulation of debt, and resulted in high corporate
leverage. The channeling of household savings by banks to corporates lead to a highly
leveraged financial structure, with high ratios of bank liabilities to GDP, and resulted in
leveraged  corporates. The resulting  high levels  of  leverage, compared with  countries
where slower-growth and more balanced financial systems, that have developed equity
and bond  markets. The ensuing financial structure was inherently risky, and vulnerable
to  internal and  external shocks. It is  interesting that  most of the  countries with poor
ROCE  have  underdeveloped  capital  markets,  and  relied  heavily  on  bank  financing.
Ironically, the key foundations that ensure the success of capital markets--transparency,
corporate accountability and governance, and proper risk pricing via the transmission of
market  signals-  were  lacking,  and  were  therefore  underlying  deficiencies  of  the
" Provided  that the legal system  has provisions  for such lending,  lenders  can grant  new credit that has
priority  for repayment.
40 See  Veneroso  and  Wade,  op cit.30
performance of corporates in Asia. These limitations possibly amplified the magnitude of
the corporate excesses, leading to the crisis.
Citing one absolute statistic- the bond market in Asia  is under 20% of GDP, low by
comparison  to  developed bond markets - e.g., the US bond market  is over  100% of
GDP.  In  a  relative  context,  the  comparative  statistics  presented  in  Figure  13  is
instructive. They suggest that in general, the region has exhibited over-dependence on the
banking sector and under-reliance on capital markets in absolute and relative terms. the
Exhibit  documents the lack of  relative balance in development of financial markets.
Figure 13: The Bond market in relative terms
Composition  of Financial Assets  by  Type,  1995
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The implication of the analysis is that a more open, balanced and competitive financial
system,  in  which  capital  is  more  allocated  in  a  more  transparent  fashion,  and  with
appropriate  consideration for risk  is needed in Asia 4 . A first  macro remedial  step  is
offered by the overwhelming evidence of high leverage witnessed in Asia, and analysis of
"' World Bank researchi ( see  Demirguc-Kunt, Asli and Ross Levine) has documented that vibrant equity
markets complement bank financing.31
the underlying macro financial linkages of intermediation through the banking system.
An inescapable conclusion, is that in addition to rehabilitation of  the banking system,
the policy agenda  in Asia should strive for development of domestic capital markets.
Increased reliance on capital markets, and attendant benefits in terms of transparency,
risks  assessment  and  pricing,  and  dispersion  of  risk  across  participants  would  have
salutary benefits on future  corporate discipline and performance in the Asia region. It
suggests a dire need for development of a balanced financial sector, with vibrant equity
and bond markets.
Capital  Flows.  In the context of the high  Tobin q's  during  a period  of rapid  capital
inflows, a question  that needs to be explored, is whether portfolio capital inflows had an
influence on valuations? The rapid increase in foreign participation the early 90's was in
context  of large  closely held positions  of  shares and a  limited float  (See  Figure  14).
Foreign  investors now account for  a significance presence in terns  of ownership and
transactions in Asian capital markets 42.
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Percent  Held by Top 5 Shareholders,





20%  . b  .
10%
42  Pomerleano, Michael, Performance of  Emerging Market Equity Investments, Emerging Markets
Quarterly, Spring, 199832
Therefore a  possible implications is that the "exuberant" valuations in  East Asia  were
associated with  large portfolio equity inflows in an illiquid market. In such a situation
marginal flows might have had a disproportionate impact on valuations.  For instance, the
following calculations for Thailand  in Table 16 suggest that Equity Flow as a percentage
of Free Float Market Capitalization reached a high of 6  percent in 1993.  Although the
percentage  portfolio  flows  were  significant  as  a  percentage  of  free  float  market
capitalization additional research is required to explore this issue. Preliminary evidence
suggests  that  it  is  unlikely  that  portfolio  equity  flows  had  a  marked  impact  on
valuations 43.
Table  16- Thailand
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994
Portfolio equity flows (US$ mill)  449  41  4  3,117  (538)
Market Capitalization (US$ mill)  23896  35815  58259  130510  131479
Free Float Market Capitalization (40%  of total)  9,558  14,326  23,304  52,204  52,592
Equity Flows/Free  Float Market Capitalization  4.7%  0.3%  0.0%  6.0%  -1.0%
Regulatory  and Supervisory  Framework.  Finally,  the findings  deepen  our understanding
of the crisis, and offer lessons for the future. There were clearly micro excesses, within a
disciplined  and benign macro financial context. In the past,  there were  several safety
mechanisms  built into the Asian financial system  to manage the micro  risks. Among
them, mild interest rates oppression subsidized corporations to the detriment of savers.
Second, well established long-term relations between companies and banks, which turned
debt into quasi-equity (the  proverbial Asian evergreens"). This relationship suggests lax
credit  allocation  processes,  (possibly  supporting  projects  of  politically  connected
individuals and organizations), without reference to projects viability. The preponderance
of  the  evidence  collaborates  Krugman's  hypothesis  that  crony  capitalism,  and  the
supportive and necessary poor policies designed to "aid and abate" poor credit decisions-
implicit government guarantees, and lax banking supervision lead to poor investments,
4  See Choe, Hyuk ,Bong-Chan Kho, Rene Stultz "Do Foreign Investors Destabilize Stock Markets? The
Korean Experience  in 1997" SSRN Electronic Library and Post, Mitchell A  and Kimberlee Millar  U  S.
Emerging  Market Equity  Funds  and the  1997 Crisis  in Asian Financial  Markets  by  INVESTMENT
COMPANY INSTITUTE PERSPECTIVE Vol. 4 / No. 2 June 199833
and  misallocation  of  resources.  The  lack  of  appropriate  financial  incentives  and
institutional  factors"  in  East Asia  lead to  a  plausible  explanation  of the  mixture  of
currency, corporate and banking crises confronting the region. These recent liberalization
of the financial sector and imposition of market discipline, including lifting of interest
rate controls, was undertaken without adequate prudential framework. The implications
for enhanced regulation and supervision of the financial system are unmistakable. The
recent introduction of improved loan classification systems and  capital adequacy norms 45
are welcomed and encouraging first steps toward improved regulation and supervision,
but  are nevertheless  only  preliminary first  steps that need to  be  supplemented by  an
enhanced regulatory framework and improved enforcement.
-END-
44  For instance,  Tobin's  q and the incentives  for capital fornation are reflective  of monetary  policy, and
portfolio  equity  inflows.
45  . The increased  scrutiny  to credit quality  probably  contributed  to the recent adverse  developments.  For
instance: enhanced regulatory and supervisory efforts addressed at  Thai finance companies lead to
revelations  about  their poor condition,  and possibly  precipitated  the onset  of the crisis.34
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APPENDIX  1: Altman's Z Score - The Methodology
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Total Assets
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Total Liabilities
Working Capital.  to Total  Working Capital to  x 1.2
Assets  Total Assets
Retained Earnings to Total  Retained Earnings to  x 1.4
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